iud military meaning

Iud Military Meaning - The US military seems to have established a narrative that it has won every tactical engagement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. From this perspective, the failure of the strategy and the challenges of nation-building have shown that coalition counterinsurgency efforts will fail in any conflict. Even the most critical accounts of the U.S. military's performance in wars, such as Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Bolger's

Emphasizes American "tactical excellence" in campaigns. However, such a conclusion seems to equate the tactic with firearms and ignores the US military's inability to combat the enemy's weapon—the improvised explosive device (IED).

Iud Military Meaning

As roadside bombs began to cause the majority of American casualties, counter-IED efforts sought to defeat the strategic impact of IEDs. Significant US military investment and innovation in countering IEDs has improved US forces' odds in any encounter with these devices. However, the scale of these innovations cost US forces more, even as they made bombs more expensive. And while these innovations reduced the risk to US forces, they did not change the way the device was deployed against military targets in conflicts. In a protracted battle over an IED-laden site, the initiative remains with the bomb maker.

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As an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) officer tasked with conducting anti-weapons targets in Iraq and Afghanistan, I tried to explore what we could learn from this battle and discuss: How successful has the US military been against IEDs? What worked and what didn't? And what do the lessons of countering IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan mean as improvised threats to US military operations continue to diversify and multiply?

No other weapon has shaped the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan like IEDs. It required soldiers tasked with increasing the security of the population to be confined to massive armored vehicles and travel at high speed or plow through farmers' fields to avoid roads entirely. He slowed down the dismounted troops, who were forced to pick up metal detectors and move across the empty intersection. He divided Baghdad with 12-foot-high concrete walls and caused fertilizer shortages for farmers in Afghanistan. It was the insurgents' only weapon capable of mass civilian casualties, undermining local authorities, the credibility of counterinsurgency efforts, and ensuring a steady stream of atrocities—the horrors of intervention—could be spread globally.

Whether measured in blood or treasure, IEDs have also proven to be the costliest element of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for US troops. Sixty percent of American deaths in Iraq and half of American deaths in Afghanistan, more than 3,500 in all, were caused by IEDs. The same proportion applies to Americans who were wounded, totaling more than 30,000 service members. When history looks back on these wars, the dominant images will be the aftermath of these improvised bombs, their devastating effects on a Baghdad market or on veterans and Afghan amputees.

Among the standard insurgent weapons—bullets, mortars, grenades—IEDs provide a unique advantage. After all, an IED is a weapon waiting to be discovered. It does not require insurgents to be exposed to use it, which balances the risk in favor of the bomber. Unlike a gunfight where soldiers catch a roadside bomb, the best possible outcome is a return to the status quo. There is no opportunity to gain the initiative and go into battle with the enemy. Even a high success rate in finding and removing roadside bombs puts counterinsurgents at a cost-risk disadvantage over time. This imbalance makes the IED, once planted, an asymmetric weapon—an unconventional method in which a weaker adversary gains a significant advantage. IEDs allowed insurgents to target American military strategy as well as American forces. It has undermined US advantages in resources, technology and land warfare, while undermining its credibility and thus the sustainability of its resources and risk investments in conflicts.

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IED exposure has required a significant effort by US military forces and aggressive targeting against IEDs. In 2006, the Department of Defense established the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to oversee the fight against it. JIEDDO's noble mission was to defeat IEDs "as a weapon of strategic influence." Former JIEDDO director Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz said it was never about eliminating IEDs entirely, but increasing the cost and risk of using IEDs by insurgents to the point where the enemy would "move on to something else."

Six years later, as US troops were closing up shop in Iraq and the surge in Afghanistan was winding down, a Government Accountability Office report noted that JIEDDO still had not developed "outcome-related strategic objectives" for its counter-IED mission. However, three outcome-related questions come to mind in order to assess counter-IED efforts against JIEDDO's mission statement. First, has the cost and risk preference of insurgents using the device decreased over time? Second, are IED casualties falling faster among US forces than overall? Third, how might IEDs affect changes in US strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan? Each question can be considered in the context of the three lines of action in the US doctrine against IEDs. First, "defeat the device" by locating, cleaning, and protecting it. Second, "attacking the network" that financed, built and deployed it through strikes, raids, detentions and control of material components. Third, “train the force” to prepare friendly forces for successful operations in IED-laden terrain.

Efforts to detect, remove, and protect against IEDs have shown modest gains during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The find and clear rate in both theaters improved from 40 percent in the first months of the wars to 60 percent by the end of 2011. Also quadrupled the number of attacks needed to cause a victim, from five to 20. The total number of IED attacks has also fallen sharply since June 2007, six months after a 15 percent increase in US troop numbers. The same month also marked the beginning of the "Awakening," when Sunni tribes began increasingly cooperating with U.S. forces against the insurgency. As a result, the IED death toll dropped dramatically even before coalition troop numbers were similarly reduced. In Iraq, key technical innovations gained the upper hand against IEDs, but the tide turned only when advances were made against the insurgency itself.

But the gains in Afghanistan came much later and in a different form. In 2010, IEDs were winning—the number of attacks needed to kill actually dropped from 14 to 11. The total number of IED casualties then rose sharply as the US troop surge implemented a counterinsurgency strategy that required more dispersal of patrols among Afghans. Population. When the tide receded in 2012 and Afghan forces took the lead, coalition IED casualties dropped from 60 to 40 percent of total casualties. In the same year, attacks against Afghan forces increased by 124 percent. Coalition IED losses continued to decline due to additional pressure on Afghan forces. Since 2012, the overall level of attacks has remained high and varies seasonally rather than interannually. In Afghanistan, adaptation reduced risk to coalition troops more than innovation. The leadership of local security forces and the removal of coalition forces have reduced the IED threat more than innovative ways to deal with these devices.

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The US military has been able to make modest gains against IEDs by innovating ways to better detect, disable and defend against the bombs. However, the 50 percent increase in detections and clearances was far enough to make the insurgents consider abandoning the facility. When a $265 device can disable a $525,000 armored vehicle, quadrupling the number of bombs required for effectiveness does not shift the cost and risk in favor of counterinsurgency. Despite efforts to control access to IED components, the devices actually became cheaper over the course of the wars, even as armor, electronic interlocks, and mine detectors became more expensive. The innovation saved lives and improved freedom of maneuver, but barely destroyed the asymmetric advantage of the IED.

Counter-IED efforts have had more success increasing the risk to insurgents. During the 18 months in Iraq that coincided with the invasion and awakening, JIEDDO strongly supported the targeting of bomb-making networks, combining biometric data from the devices themselves and intelligence from all sources to enable operations that killed or captured 691 "highly regarded terrorists." separating the US's "network attack" effort from the surge and wake as a whole, but it can still be said that these operations had the advantage of precision enemy strikes and airstrikes, where US units had the tactical advantage.

Breakthroughs against IED victims occurred in 2008 in Iraq and in 2013 in Afghanistan. In both cases, the US military's new counterinsurgency doctrine proved correct: the change in the relationship between US soldiers and the local population made a huge difference to the overall security situation, including IEDs. These are in Iraq